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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOANNA MITCHELL,
individually, and JOANNA
MITCHELL, persona1
representative of the estate
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased,
Appellants,
v.

Court of Appeals No. 930296
District Court No. 910902469

Estate of JERRY L. RICE, and
JOHN DOES 1 through V,

Priority No. 15

Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether as a matter of law Jerry
Rice was an employee or an independent contractor for Jerry
Mitchell as defined under Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(b)•
This being an appeal from the trial court's granting of
Appellee's motion for Summary Judgment, the applicable standards of
review are as follows:
A.

The appellant is entitled to have all the facts, and all

inferences

arising

favorable to her.

therefrom,

considered

in

the

light

most

Briggs v. Halcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App.
1

1987); Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
B.

An appellate court accords no deference to the trial

court's legal conclusions in support of the grant of summary
judgment, but reviews them for correctness.

Bevnon v. St. George

Dixie Lodge. 210 U.A.R. 63 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North
America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42 (1993)
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-60 (1953)
The full text of the above controlling statutory and constitutional authority is fully set out in appendix to appellants brief
in accordance with Rule 24(a)(6) and 24(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a wrongful death action brought against the Estate of
Jerry Rice by the widow of the decedent Jerry Mitchell, JoAnna
Mitchell as personal representative of his estate. Jerry Mitchell
and Jerry Rice were killed in an accident while driving a truck for
Logistics Express. The plaintiff has alleged that Jerry Mitchell's
death was the result of the negligence of Jerry Rice in operating
the motor vehicle.
Course of Proceedings
On March 16, 1993 the appellee moved for summary judgment
claiming appellant's cause of action was barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code
2

Annotated Section 35-1-60. After briefing and oral arguments from
both parties, Judge Glasmann granted appellee's motion for summary
judgment on June 1, 1993.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Glasmann granted appellee's motion for summary judgment
on June lf 1993.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 19, 1989, Jerry L. Rice and Jerry H. Mitchell
died

in a motor vehicle accident while driving a truck for

Logistics Express.

(R. 135).

Mr. Mitchell's widow, JoAnna

Mitchell, filed a complaint against the Estate of Jerry L. Rice
alleging that her husband's death was a result of Mr. Rice's
negligence in driving the truck.

(R. 1).

Mr. Mitchell drove for Logistics Express pursuant to an
independent contractor lease agreement.

(R. 136). This document

attempts to define the relationship between Mr. Mitchell and
Logistics Express.

(R. 239) .

Jerry Rice was not a party to the

above-referenced lease agreement.

(R. 239). The lease agreement

explicitly provides in several clauses that Jerry Mitchell was an
independent contractor of Logistics Express.

(R. 239).

In

paragraph 2 of the Terms and Conditions of the Lease Agreement, the
document refers to the "Owner, its employees, agents and servants."
(R. 239).
The lease agreement also provides that the "[o]wner warrants
and agrees that it shall have full and direct control and supervision over the operation of the motor vehicle . . . " (R. 239). The
3

agreement further provides that the M[o]wner may determine the
routes of travel, points of stop for rest and service to its
equipment, and shall in every respect, direct and control its
employees, including their hire, discharge, training, wages, hours
and working conditions,"

(R. 239).

With respect to the maintenance of workers

compensation

coverage as well as the payment of withholding taxes, the agreement
provides as follows:
Owner shall obtain and be solely responsible
for Worker's Compensation insurance for Owner
and Owner's employees, if any. In addition,
Owner shall pay all withholding and employment
taxes due to Federal, State or local government on account of Owner and/or Owner's employees . . . (R. 239).
Jerry Rice is not mentioned by name in the lease agreement
executed among Mitchell and Logistics Express. (R.239).
The specific method by which Worker's Compensation coverage
was provided in this case was through Logistic's Express as stated
in paragraph 5 of the lease agreement.
In order to assist Owner in obtaining Worker's
Compensation insurance coverage provided for
herein with respect to any employee(s) employed by Owner . . . Logex has arranged for
insurance in which Owner may voluntarily, at
Owner's sole cost and expense, elect to participate . . . "
(R. 239).
Jerry Mitchell elected to be insured under Logistics Express'
program. Therefore, Logistics Express purchased Worker's Compensation insurance for Mitchell and Rice, and the Mitchells in turn
paid for this coverage out of their reimbursement for each trip.
(R. 139).
4

In addition to the lease agreement, other documents were
presented

in the proceedings below to aid the court

determination.

in its

A document labeled "Exhibit C" on page 179 of the

record was executed between Jerry Rice and Logistics Express.

It

characterizes Rice as an employee of Mitchell. Jerry Mitchell was
not a party to this agreement.

Kelly Jensen, an employee of

Logistics Express stated that this document was not meant to define
the relationship between Jerry Rice and Jerry Mitchell.

(R. 165,

185, 186).
Another document submitted to the trial court is an agreement
between Jerry Rice and Jerry and JoAnna Mitchell.

(R. 180). This

agreement provides that Jerry Rice was to work on a commission
basis.

It further states that Jerry Rice was responsible for

paying his own income tax and social security tax.

(R. 180).

The defendant submitted a document to the trial court entitled
"Owner Operator and Owner Operator Driver Questionnaire."

(R.

226) . This document, filled out by Jerry Rice, lists as prior work
history, work performed for Jerry Mitchell. The previous times he
worked for Mr. Mitchell, Rice noted that he stopped working because
of a "reduction in force."

(R. 226, 227). This document does not

attempt to define the relationship between Mitchell and Rice.
The record also reflects facts relating to the course of
conduct between Mitchell and Rice. Jerry Rice would, on occasion,
drive with Mr. Mitchell on the various trucking assignments Mr.
Mitchell would receive from Logistics Express.

(R. 163-65).

However, Jerry Rice was under no obligation to drive with Mr.
5

Mitchell,

In fact, Jerry Rice would often refuse to go on runs

with Mr. Mitchell.

(R. 164). When Jerry Rice would drive on runs

with Mr. Mitchell, Jerry Rice would determine when, where and for
how long to stop on rest breaks.

(R. 164) .

When paying Jerry

Rice, Mr. Mitchell did not withhold income tax or social security
tax.

(R. 165). In addition, Logistics Express purchased Workers

Compensation Insurance for Mitchell and Rice, which was paid
through a deduction in the reimbursement the Mitchells would
receive from Logistics Express.

(R. 139).

Finally, Jerry Rice

would sometimes use Jerry Mitchell's truck to perform runs for
Logistics Express by himself.

(R. 200).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the multifactor test set forth in Utah Code Annotated
Section

35-1-42

and

subsequent

case

law, Jerry

Rice was an

independent contractor of Jerry Mitchell and not his employee.
Jerry Rice paid his own withholding tax.

To the extent power and

control could be exercised in a trucking assignment, both Mitchell
and Rice had equal power and control.

Rice worked when he wanted

to, and not at Mitchell's command. There is no evidence to suggest
that Mitchell exercised any power and control over the work beyond
that which

a proprietor

would

exercise

over

an

independent

contractor.
Furthermore, case law relied upon by the appellee in moving
for summary judgment is not relevant.

The facts presented in the

Kinne decision are markedly different than the facts presently
before the court.

Thus, the court's reliance on Kinne was mis6

placed.

The Kinne court was not presented with a fact situation

which was entirely inconsistent with the existence of an employment
relationship. Therefore, the Kinne decision is not controlling on
the disposition of this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

RICE WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF MITCHELL, THEREFORE
JOANNA M I T C H E L L ' S CLAIM I S N O T B A R R E D BY T H E E X C L U SIVE REMEDY PROVISION.

Judge Glasmann granted the Estate of Jerry Rice's summary
judgment on three bases.

First, Judge Glasmann believed the case

of Kinne v. Industrial Commission,

609 P.2d

926

(Utah 1980),

discussed below, was the closest on point. Second, the court based
its decision on the written documents purporting to define the
relationship between the parties.

Finally, the court also noted

that the conduct between the parties was suggestive of an employment relationship.

It is Mitchell's position that Judge Glasmann

erred in concluding that Jerry Rice was Jerry Mitchell's employee
as a matter of law.

The record clearly reflects both factual

disputes, and in the alternative, facts which do not entitle the
appellee to judgment as a matter of law.

Essentially, under the

multifactor tests set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42
and case law defining these factors, the facts of this case do not
lend themselves to only one reasonable conclusion.

As such,

summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the proper test for
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor under Utah's Worker's Compensation
7

Act, Utah Code

Annotated Section 35-1-43(1)(b).
Speaking in generality, an employee is one who
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as
directed by the employer and who is subject to
a comparatively high degree of control in
performing those duties.
In contrast, an
independent contractor is one who is engaged
to do some particular project or piece of
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do
the job in his [or her] own way, subject to
only minimal restriction or controls and is
responsible only for its satisfactory completion. Harry L. Young & Sons v. Ashton, 538
P.2d 316 (Utah 1975).
The court went on to list the appropriate
considered under this analysis.

facts to be

First, "whatever covenants or

agreements exist concerning the right of direction and control over
the employee, whether express or implied;"

second, "the right to

hire and fire;" third, "the method of payment, i.e. whether in
wages or fees, as compared to payment for a complete job or
project;"

and finally, fourth, "the furnishing of the equipment."

Id. at 318.
Several Utah cases have addressed independent lease agreements
and their effect on the status of individuals under Utah's Workers
Compensation system.

While facing similar lease agreements, the

courts in those cases faced markedly different facts regarding the
parties' actual course of conduct.

For instance, in Kinne v.

Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980), the court was
presented with a lease agreement between an owner operator and a
trucking company.

This lease agreement provided that the owner-

operator was to be responsible for the direction and control of his
employees.

The owner-operator hired an individual to drive his

truck and that individual was later injured.

In Kinne, the owner-

operator was attempting to evade payment of Workers Compensation
benefits to the driver.

The court found that the driver was an

employee of the owner-operator.

The court reasoned as follows:

The agreement gave Kinne the legal right of
direction and control over Wynn, even though
such right may not have been exercised. It is
the right of control that is the critical
element underlying an employment relationship
in the present case. Id. at 928.
In this context, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the findings
of the Industrial Commission.

"These factors support the Com-

mission's finding that Kinne was Wynn's employer."

Id. The Kinne

court was not presented with a course of conduct between the owneroperator and the driver which was inconsistent with and contrary to
the terms of the lease agreement between the owner-operator and the
trucking company.

Neither was the Kinne court presented with a

document between the actual parties to the case (the owner-operator
and the driver) setting forth terms of the relationship inconsistent with the maintenance of an employer-employee relationship.
Thus the Kinne decision was rendered in a factual context radically
different than the one before the court today.
Appellees in the proceeding below attempted to focus on the
potential right to control of Mr. Mitchell.

Although language in

the Kinne decision states the unexercised right to control was a
crucial factor in its determination, again, the facts of this case
present a different fact pattern.

What is present in the instant

case is not unexercised power, but rather, a course of conduct
totally inconsistent with the exercise of the type of power found
9

crucial in Kinne.
The facts indicate that what right to power and control that
existed was equally exercised by Mitchell and Rice.

The right to

determine the destination and the route to the destination did not
exist.

This was already predetermined by the very nature of the

trucking assignment.

A trucking assignment to deliver goods from

Salt Lake City to Denver does not leave much in the way of
discretion as to how and where to go.

When there was room for

discretion, both parties exercised equal power and control.

The

facts were undisputed that when Rice was driving he could determine
where, when and for how long to break.

Furthermore, as to the

discretion as to whether to take an assignment, the facts also show
that Rice would drive with Mitchell whenever he felt like it, and
would often refuse to go on runs with Mr. Mitchell even though Mr.
Mitchell needed him for the trip. This course of conduct is simply
inconsistent with an employer relationship.

As such, the Kinne

decision is not controlling and Judge Glasmann's reliance on the
Kinne case in this instance was error.
Also notably absent from the Kinne decision are documents
executed between the actual parties manifesting an inconsistent
intent.

(R. 180) . In a document executed between Jerry Rice and

the Mitchells, Jerry Rice agrees to work on a commission basis, to
take care of his own income and social security tax.

Finally, a

document attempting to label Rice as an employee of Mitchell, was
not, according to an agent of Logistics Express, meant to define
the relationship between Mitchell and Rice, but rather to make sure
10

that Rice was not to be considered an employee of Logistics
Express. The only document executed between the parties before the
court here is inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship.
The existence of these two sets of facts did not entitle the
estate of Jerry Rice to judgment as a matter of law.

The record

clearly reflects a course of conduct entirely inconsistent with the
maintenance of an employment relationship between Mitchell and
Rice.

Appellant has cited to the record facts establishing that

Rice was able to determine when, where and for how long to take
rest breaks.

Rice also had discretion as to whether to go on a

particular job with Mitchell.

This type of independence was

recognized as an indication of an independent contractor relationship in Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1198 (Utah 1984).
In that case, the plaintiff "worked on any house he chose whether
being constructed by Thorne or someone else who had employed [the
worker] on unrelated jobs." Id. at 1197. Similarly with Rice, the
facts indicate that Rice would work whenever he felt like it, and
would take what jobs he wanted to take, not what jobs Mitchell
wanted him to take.
The other set of facts refers to the documents executed among
the parties: Jerry Rice, Jerry Mitchell and Logistics Express.
First, the lease agreement by its own terms gives Mitchell power
and control over those that drive with him.

However, the factual

record demonstrates a course of conduct inconsistent with the lease
agreement.

In fact, the lease agreement also states that Mitchell

was supposed to pay Rice's withholding tax.
11

Mitchell did not do

this.

This is yet another aspect of the conduct of the parties

inconsistent with the lease agreement.

Further vitiating the

effect of the lease agreement is the fact that Rice was not even a
party to an agreement which allegedly defines the relationship
between Mitchell and Rice.

Instead, the document was drafted by

Logistics Express and is clearly drafted so that Logistics Express
can escape any liability to Rice.

Jerry Rice is not specifically

mentioned in the lease agreement.

This shows that the provisions

in the lease agreement are general provisions.

In no way can they

be said to define the relationship between Mitchell and Rice.

In

sum, the lease agreement in this case is not a proper basis for
granting summary judgment to the appellees.
The other document characterizing Rice as an employee of
Mitchell was entered into between Rice and Logistics Express.
Mitchell was not a party to this agreement. An agent of Logistics
Express stated that this document was not meant to define the
relationship between Mitchell and Rice.
Finally, the one document to which Mitchell and Rice were both
parties sets forth terms inconsistent with an employment relationship. This document states that Rice was to pay his own withholding taxes.

This is another factor recognized in Utah law as

favoring the conclusion that Rice was an independent contractor.
In Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation. 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984), the
court found persuasive the fact that the worker "made no deductions
for social security or withholding taxes as required generally by
employers."

Xd. at 1197.

The court also noted that "others that
12

employed him also did not deduct social security or withholding
taxes."

Id.

This was also the case with Rice.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hether the factual
inferences to be drawn from the evidence meet the legal definition
of "employee" under the Worker's Compensation Act is a question for
the jury."
(Utah 1992).

Gourdin By and Through Close v. Scera, 845 P.2d 242
In noting that a directed verdict was inappropriate,

even though the facts may be undisputed, the court stated that "no
single factor is completely controlling. Moreover, employee status
is not by its dictionary definition, but rather by whether the
facts and circumstances bring the worker within the requirements of
the Workers Compensation Act." Id.
The determination of whether Rice was Mitchell's employee was
not properly determined in the context of a summary judgment. The
existence of facts pointing in both directions is further suggestive that summary judgment was inappropriate in this instance.
CONCLUSION
"Summary judgment can be granted when no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Any doubts or uncertainties concerning issues
of fact must be construed in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment." Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Betta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Construing the facts in the light most favorable

to the appellant, summary judgment in this case was improper.
There are factual disputes in this instance concerning the course
of conduct between the parties. There is also a dispute about the
13

proper

inferences to be drawn from the facts which are not

disputed.

Under Gourdin By and Through Close v. Scera, 845 P.2d

242 (Utah 1992) this is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
The determination as to whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor is a fact sensitive inquiry.

A full trial

should have been held so that the trier of fact could properly make
a determination as to whether Rice was an independent contractor.
The facts in this case for the most part point to a finding that
Rice was an independent contractor.
opposite conclusion.

Some factors point to the

Given this factual conflict, Judge Glasmann

should not have ruled on the matter absent a full evidentiary
hearing.
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ADDENDUM

335

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

tomary trade relationship between general contractors and subcontractors.
(c) A portion of a construction project subcontracted to others may be considered to be a part
or process in t h e trade or business of the general
building contractor, only if the general building
contractor, without regard to whether or not it
would need additional employees, would perform
the work in the normal course of its trade or business.
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing,
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence
t h a t he owns or is in the process of acquiring as
his personal residence may not be considered an
employee or employer solely by operation of Subsection (a).
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a
sole proprietorship may not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if:
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-l-43<3)(a); or
(ii) the person is included as an employee
under Subsection 35-1-43(3)(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide
adequate payment of direct compensation,
which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or
shared control or responsibility.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (eHn):
(i) a partner of a partnership and an
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed
to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the burden of proof being on any person
seeking to establish the contrary; and
(ii) evidence affirmatively
establishing
t h a t a partner of a partnership or an owner
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control
or responsibility for any failure to insure or
otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may
not be considered an employee under Subsection
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43(3Kb).
1993
35-1-43.

" E m p l o y e e , " "worker" or " w o r k m e n , "
and "operative" defined — Mining less e e s and s u b l e s s e e s — P a r t n e r s and
sole proprietors — C o r p o r a t e officers
and d i r e c t o r s — Real e s t a t e a g e n t s a n d
brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workmen," and "operative" mean(a) each elective and appointive officer and
any other person, in the service of the state, or of
any county, city, town, or school district within
t h e state, serving the state, or any county, city,
town, or school district under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express
or implied, written or oral, including each officer
and employee of the state institutions of learning
and members of the National Guard while on
state active duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer,
' as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or
more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied,

U W - J I - « T .

oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but
not including any person whose employment is
casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of
mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for t h a t type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may
elect to include as an employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission naming the persons to be
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee
under this chapter until this notice has been
given. For premium rate making, the insurance
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the
employee to be 150% of- the state's average
weekly wage.
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any
director or officer of the corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes
this election, it shall serve written notice upon
its insurance carrier and upon the commission
naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for
a real estate broker if:
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from
real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed under a written contract specifying t h a t the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states t h a t the real estate
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as
an employee for federal income tax purposes.
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or
64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation.
1993
35-1-44. Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be
construed as follows:
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules
provided in Section 35-1-75.
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
the commission as to the amount of compensation
due any injured, or the dependents of any deceased, employee.
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
benefits provided for in this title.
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tnbutory negligence Proof of the mjuiy shall consti
tute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the employer and the burden shall be upon the em
ployer to show freedom from negligence resulting in
such injury And such employers shall also be subject
to the provisions of the two sections next succeeding
[Sections 35-1-58, 35-1-591 In any civil action permitted under this section against the employer the em
ployee shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the employer
1%9

15" 1-58

R i g h t s of e m p l o y e e s w h e r e e m p l o y e r
fails to c o m p l y
Any employee, whose employer has failed to torn
ply with the provisions of Section 35 1-46, who has
been injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted,
or his dependents in case death has ensued may in
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section
[Section 35-1-57], file his application with the com
mission for compensation in accordance with the
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and
determine such application for compensation as in
other cases, and the amount of compensation which
the commission may ascertain and determine to be
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after
receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and
determined by the commission
mi
35-1-59,

D o c k e t i n g a w a r d s in district court
Enforcing judgment.
An abstract of any award may be filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of
the district court thereof The time of the receipt of
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and en
tered in the docket When so filed and docketed the
award shall constitute a hen from the time of such
docketing upon the real property of the employer sit
uated in the county, for a period of eight years from
the date of the award unless previously satisfied Ex
ecution may be issued thereon within the same time
and in the same m a n n e r and with the same effect a^
if said award were a judgment of the district court
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county
in which the applicant or the employer resides, de
pending on the district in which the final award i^
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested
by the industrial commission Where the action to
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, rea
sonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be al
lowed in addition to the award
i ( f <i
35-1-60.

E x c l u s i v e r e m e d y a g a i n s t e m p l o y e r , oi
officer, a g e n t o r e m p l o y e e — ()< c u p a
tional disease excepted.
I lie light to recover compensation pursuant to th<
provisions of this title for injuries sustained bv an
employee, whether resulting in death or not shall bt
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall
be the exclusive remedy against any officer agent or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of an\
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common
law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of km
heirs personal representatives, guardian or am

35-1-62

other person whomsoevei, on account of any accident
oi injury or death, in any way contracted sustained,
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the
ionise of or because of or arising out of his employment and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent or
employee of the employer based upon any accident,
injury or death of an employee Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended
1953
35-1-61
35-1-62

Repealed

mi

Injuries o r d e a t h c a u s e d by w r o n g f u l
icts of p e r s o n s o t h e r t h a n e m p l o y e r ,
officer, a g e n t , o r e m p l o y e e of said emp l o y e r — R i g h t s of e m p l o y e r o r i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r in c a u s e of a c t i o n — M a i n t e n a n c e of a c t i o n — N o t i c e of i n t e n t i o n
to proceed against third p a r t y — Right
to m a i n t a i n a c t i o n n o t i n v o l v i n g emp l o y e e - e m p l o y e r r e l a t i o n s h i p — Disb u r s e m e n t of p r o c e e d s of r e c o v e r y .
When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused by
the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an
employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured employee, or in case of death his
dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also have an action for damages against such third
person If compensation is claimed and the employer
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee cf the cause of action against the third
party and may bring and maintain the action either
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal representative of
the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may
not settle and release the cause of action without the
consent of the commission Before proceeding against
tht third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death his heirs, shall give written notice of such intent ion to the carrier or other person obligated for the
compensation payments, in order to give such person
a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in
the proceeding
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contract o r property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
M npving an employee-employer relationship with
I In injured or deceased employee at the time of his
injury or death
If any recovery is obtained against suth third person it shall be disbursed as follows
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear Any such fee chargeable to the
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had
against the third party
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all pay-
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Robert G. Gilchrist (A3715)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Jerry L. Rice
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOANNA MITCHELL,
individually, and JoANNA
MITCHELL, personal
representative of the estate
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Estate of JERRY L. RICE, and
JOHN DOES 1 through V,
Defendants.

*
*

JUDGMENT
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

WHV

Civil No. 910902469
Judge Glasmann

Based upon the order of the court granting the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment issued concurrently
herewith, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
defendant the Estate of Jerry L. Rice, is hereby awarded judgment
in its favor against plaintiff JoAnna Mitchell, individually, and
as personal representative of the estate of Jerry Mitchell,
deceased, and that plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the
Complaint filed in the consolidated action, are hereby dismissed
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with prejudice and on the merits
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with rnrti party to bear their

own costs.
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Robert/ G. Gilchrist
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Jerry L> ni,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on
this c£W
day of W\aju
, 1993, to the following counsel
of record:
&
James R. Hasenyager
MARQUARDT HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2661 Washington Blvd #202
Ogden, Utah 84401
Gainer M. Waldbillig
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Defendants Logistics Express
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for the reasons stated in the
written memorandum and exhibits submitted therewith, that
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that judgment on the
merits be entered for defendant the Estate of Jerry L. Rice,
dismissing the plaintiff's Amended Complaint and her Complaint
filed in the consolidated action, with prejudice, with each party
to bear its own costs.
DATED this

/^^day of

X^y^U^

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:
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ufftL^^i

The Honorable Michael A.
Glasmann
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MA^QUARDT HASE^YAGEfc & CUSTEN

J«ames R. Hasenyager //
Attorneys for Plaintjxf
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER^
& NELSON

Robert G. Gilchrist
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Jerry L. Rice
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